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(From the Philadelphia Kublic Ledger, August 20, 1919) 

Diplomatic Controversy 

over the 

Shantung Peninsula 

and 

The Harbor of Kiao Chau 

By WILLI.IM D. B* AINEY, \A.. D., I.. H. D. 

Forinei- Member l-'oroisii Aft'airs t'oiiiiiiittee of Cimgi-ess, Secre- 
tai.v Ja|>aiiese-Aiiierii'iiii (iioui) luierparliaiiieiiUiry Union 

Japan's ultiuiatuiu to Germany in 1!)]4 brought Kiao- 
chau into the foreground of publie attention, but before that 
for many years it had been an oli.jei-tivt- in <liplomatic contro- 
versy. The latest phase i.s its appearance in the Versailles 
eovenant in which its possession is eontiiuied to Japan over 
the protest of China. Hardly known in tliis country except 
to the occasional traveler, the student of Oriental movements 
or to diplomats. Kiao-ehau has played a most peculiar part in 
the great drama of the Par East. To what extent it has in- 
fluenced the pages of history and the course of war it is im- 
possible definitely to state, but it has been an important stake 
in the world's game of politics in which the nations have been, 
so long engaged in China. 

It was toward Kiao-cliau and not toward Port Arthur 
that Russia turned for her long desired and not yet realized 
open port on the Pacific. Thwarted in this by Germany's 
coup in 1897, Russia's next choice was Port Arthur, securing 
which she crowded upon the interests of Japan, and thus ifr 
voh-ed herself in the Ru.sso-Japanese war, at the close of 
which, under the treaty of Portsmouth, she lost Port Arthur 
and the Ru.ssiah eyes were turned again toward North China 
afi'd the Shanttuig peninsula. 



Long before the Trans-Siberian Railroad was completed 
Russia's program involved, tirst, the construction of a link in 
that railroad system as it was designed, crossing Chinese Man- 
churia, on the way to Vladivostok ; second, the harbor of Kiao- 
chau for the Russian tleet ; third, the construction of a rail- 
road to connect with the Trans-Siberian line near Lake Baikal 
in Siberia and passing southward through Chinese Mongolia 
to Pekin. The Chinese Government for a long time was not 
inclined to give favorable consideration to these projects. 
When Count Cassini became the Russian mini.ster to Pekin he 
established exceedingly close personal relations with Li Hung 
Chang, who was by far the ablest^ and perhaps the most influ- 
ential man then in Chinese public life. The coronation of the 
Czar, 1895-6, was seized upon as an occasion for strengthen- 
ing Russian influence in China ; Count Cassini presented an 
invitation to the imperial government of China and urged 
that a prince of the royal blood should represent it at the 
coronation services in Moscow. It was found that custom raised 
some objection to a member of the ro.val family leaving the 
imperial domains, and, as Russia jierhaps foresaw, Li Hung 
Chang was designated the ro.val substitute and made the 
■official representative. 

Li Hung Chang's reception in Moscow was princely and 
he was accorded an exalted place and given highest considera- 
tion among the representatives of royalty assembled for this 
august occasion. The Russian authorities, however, did not 
overlook the opportunity to discu.ss the Far Eastern questions 
with their guest. Upon Li Hung Chang's return to Pekin 
there was a marked change in the attitude of China toward 
Rassia. The Ru.ssian railroad and territorial program was no 
longer opposed. It was then asserted and since has been well 
established that at JIoscow Li concluded a secret treaty with 
Russia, the terms of which had theretofore been tentatively 
agreed upon with Count Cassini in Pekin, from which it has 
been designated the Cassini convention. Pressed by other 
nations the Chinese Government gave out an official denial of 
the existence of such a treaty ; but this denial fell in the light 




t"flti»FERSEB Ht«« 
WV E 1919 













cf subsequent affirmations of all its principal features. Under 
its terms Russia sei-ured a lease of Kiao-ehan and the I'i^lit to 
oonstruet a railroad across northern ;\i;nirliuria. thus uniting 
the two |)arts of the Trans-Siberian Railroad into a complete 
transcontinental system from Vladivostok to Jloseow. The 
eonstrnetimi of a rai!r<ind across Montrolia from Lake Baikal 
to Pekin was said to he included, and for which, in 1900. Rus- 
sian surveyors were enijaged in mai)]nnft a nnile. 

If one will take a pencil and on a ma]) of Siberia, Mongolia 
anil North Cliina. draw a straight line from some point on the 
Trans-Siberian Railroad ni-ar Lake Baikal to Pekin it will 
]iass through I'rga. the I'apital city of .Mongolia, the home of 
the "living Buddh;!""; it will eross the great Mongolian des- 
ert of Gobi and then touch Kalgan near the outer Great Wall 
of China; eontinuing the line bexond Pekin toward the ea.st 
it irill v((ich the shore of the Ydloir sea at Kiao-cJiau. The 
harbor of Kiao-ehau is ideal : it is alnmst land locked with 
two points at the entrance jutting outward and two points 
.jutting inward admii-ably adapted for fortification. The bay 
is fifteen miles acro.ss and has deep-watci- anchorage. Situate 
in latitude 36 longtude and 120 on the southern shore of the 
Shantung peninsula, it is open all the year. Its position 
further -south on tlie Yellow sea and nearer the Pacific gives it 
many geographical advantages over Port Arthur. It was 
with tlie wisdom ( f careful selection that Rus.sia made it her 
choice in her search for an open port in the Par East: a 
choice which .she supposed .she had made effective. The ne- 
cessities of Russia m the Far East were apparent ; (a) a trans- 
continental railroad to the port of Vladivostok and (b) an 
open ice free port as a naval ba.se and entrepot from whii^li 
she miglit operate at all times. These were j)rovided for in 
the Cassini convention. 

Xotvvithstauding the Chinese Government's assurance 
that no such treaty had been made, its terms became well 
known, and followed, no doubt, very closely the text of the 
copy published in the North China Daily News on October 30, 
1896, Article IX of which, relating to Kiao-chau, is as follows: 



"Russia has never possessed a seaport in Asia which is 
free from iee and open all the year around. If, therefore, 
there should suddenly arise military operations in this con- 
tinent, it will naturally be difficult for the Russian eastern 
seas and Pacific fleets to move about freely and at pleasure. 
As China is well aware of this, she is willing to lease tempo- 
rarily to Ru.ssia the port of Kiao-chau, in the province of 
Shantung, the period of such lease being limited to fifteen 
years. At the end of this period China shall buy all the bar- 
racks godowns. machine shops and docks built there by Rus- 
sia (during her occupancy of the said port). But should there 
be no danger of military operations, Russia .shail not enter im- 
mediately into possession of the said ]iort or hold the im- 
portant points dominating the port, in order to obviate the 
chance of exciting the jealou-sy and suspicions of other pow- 
ers. ' ' 

Coincident with the activities leading up to the Cassini 
convention was the interest which Russia again evidenced 
in the construction of a railroad connecting at or near Lake 
Baikal with the Trans-Siberian Railroad. ]\Ir. Keni (Rail- 
way enterprise in China. 1907) says: 

■'Seme years ago the Russians had a scheme for a branch 
from the Trans-Siberian Railway by way of Urga and Kalgan 
to Pekin. A flying survey was made at the time, and it was 
found that virtually the only engineering difficulties would 
be experienced in the crossing of the Yablonoi ilountains 
north of Urga." 

This was the Asiatic situatioii in 1S96. Tt will lie re- 
membered that following the coronation at JIoscow, Li Hung 
Chang, in the progress of his journey, vi.sited Germany. It 
was suspected there that valuable rights had been obtained by 
Russia, and, notwithstanding Li's denials, Germany became 
convinced. "It was then (1896) that the occupancy of Kiao- 
chau by Germany was agreed tipon in principle." says Mr. 
Kent, and Germany awaited a fave-vable opportunity. It was 
not the murder of the German minister. Baron Von Kettler, 



liy Uif imperial soidicns in tiio lloxcr uprising, as ex-President 
Taft recently staled, l.ut the killing: of two missionaries by 
Chinese bandits on Xovemher H, 1897, which furnished the 
pretext, and Adnural Von Diedriek, conunander-in-chief of 
the German squadron in eastern waters, took possession of the 
heiiirhts suri'oundinp; the bay, and Germany demanded, and 
later received from China (1898) a ninet.v-nine. year lease 
of Kiao-chau, and on the same day secured a valuable rail- 
road conccs.sion assui'inii' her dominance in the Shantung pen- 
insula. This .sudden pi-o.jcction of Germany into the realm 
of North China jiolitics was not welcomed liy any of the 
nations having interests. Russia's surprise and chagrin was 
pronounced because it thwarted her aml)ition and destroyed 
the consumiiiation nf hw plans .just at the moment of their 
maturity. It i)lacc(l another factor to lie considered and dealt 
with in a zone which Rn.ssia and Japan, and, in a less active 
way, England had considered their own. 

A Russian newspaper. N'ovosti, rellectcd the popular feel- 
ing, not oidy of Russia but of Japan, when it said concerning 
the seizure of Kiao-chau: 

"This event will perhaps form a starting point for a deci- 
sion in the Par East question. Evetything depends on wheth- 
er the Germans remain in the occupied town or decide to give 
it up again. If the occupation should be a lasting one, Russia 
must take immediate .steps to safeguard her life interests in 
China. Of all the colonial struggles heretofore undertaken by 
Germany, this one with China is by far the most important, as 
it brings her into contact with the interests of Russia and 
Japan. 

"It is in no way desirable for these two states that Ger- 
many should establish herself in their close proximity and 
force Iiers(>lf into what is to a certain extent their sphere of 
influence. Moreover, if Germany is not deterred by protests 
on the part of the other powers, the occupation of Kiao-chau 
will form a very convenient excuse to ask the Reichstag to 
grant a further increase of the navy. 

"Russia especially can learn a lesson by the occupation 



of Kiao-ohau by Germau troops and it can well serve as an 
example. Russia stands greatly in need of a port free from 
ice in these regions. The Chinese Government will never of 
its own free will place a poi't at their disposal in gratitude for 
services rendered. If, therefore, Germany declines to evacu- 
ate Kiao-chau, Russia, on her side, wiU have evei\y right to 
occupy, in retaliation, some portion of Chinese territory." 

■^Following the lease Germanj- began immediately to for- 
tify the harbor and make it her naval base in the Far Ea.st. The 
Reichstag granted 5.000,000 marks for that purpose and fol- 
lowed it shortly after with another grant of 3,500,000 marks. 
A German company. "Shantung Eisenbahn Gesellsehaft," 
with a capital of 50,000,000 marks, undertook the railroad 
construction in the Shantung peninsula. The leased area 
comprised about 117 square miles and a wider zone over which 
the Chinese might issue no ordinances without the consent of 
Germany. The port town of Tsing-tao wa.s soon connected 
by rail with Chinan-fu, a .iunctiou of Pekin. This seizure by 
Germany of Kiao-chau under a very tlimsy pretext, while as 
easily justifiable as the territorial aggressions of the other 
nations in China, was resented by Russia anti Japan and not 
liked by England. The opposition to Germany's act, it must 
be admitted, was not because it violated any code of ethics 
for which the other nations contended, but because they felt 
that the field for European activity in northern China had 
been preempted by them. The weight of this act in the 
world movement is, of course, impossible to determine, but it 
must be considered as influencing in considerable measure at 
least the attitude of Ru>ssia, Japan and England in the recent 
struggle. 

Japan vie\ved the movement of Germany with as nuicli 
disfavor as did Russia, for though Russia and Japan were eon- 
testing openly or secretly every step and inch of ground 
within the conflicting area of their self-determined zones of 
influence, they looked with more ill-will upon the advent 
of a third party than they did upon the claims of each 
othei'. This, so far as Japan was concerned, was none 



the less because Germauy, in company with Russia and 
France, had despoik'd lier of the fruits of victory in her 
war with China, by coiiiitelling llie surrender of Port Ai-thui', 
wliich Japan had by contiucst and ti'caty secured from China, 
Germany's aggressive manner being particularly objection- 
able. The "advice" whicli Japan (August, 1914) submitted 
to Germauy to give up Kiao-chau, by almost exact phraseologj', 
it is said, followed the "advice" which German^' gave Japan 
at an earlier date and which constrained the latter to cede 
back I'ort Arthur to Cliina. There is at least grim liumor in 
Japan's ultimatum. 

In tlie scramble for position following Germany's seizure 
of Kiao-chau, England (1898) obtained a lease of Wei Ilai 
Wei, situate on the Shantung peninsula near the entrance of 
the Gulf of Pechili. A secret agreement between Germany 
and China with respect to the Shantung province deprived 
England of any commercial advantages by this acquisition. 
"Wei Hai Wei was valueless. Germany having entrenched 
herself at Kao-ehau and Russia being thus blocked in her Far 
Eastern program, innnediately (1898) demanded and re- 
ceived from China the concession at Port Arthur, which Jai)an 
had been forced to surrender. With it Ru.ssia obtained the 
right to construct the JIanchiu'ia railroad to connect with the 
Trans-Siberian road at Harbin. Russia immediatel.v proceed- 
ed to make of Port Arthur what she had intended to make of 
Kiao-chau. The weight of Russia's forward movement was 
thus transferred from China proper to Japan. It, of neces- 
sity, placed a heavier pressure upon and no doubt endangered 
Japan's interests in Korea and the Liao-Tung peninsula of 
IManchuria. Japan viewed the encroachment of Russia with 
alarm, and this ultimatel.v brought on war. Tims the war be- 
tween Japan and Russia was influenced, if not precipitated, by 
Germany's act in seizing Kiao-chau. The victory of Japan 
w-as followed by the treaty of Portsmouth, under whicli Russia 
gave up her lease and possession of Port Artliur. Once more 
Russia's plan for an ice-free port was thwarted. The swing 
of Russia's pendulum was again toward China proper. 



8. 

Strange to say, the Russo-Japanese war left no apparent 
feeling of ill-will between the nations engaged in it; it was 
never popular in Russia and Japan could afford the generosity 
of the victor. Out of it one who looks deeper than the 
surface discerned evidences of a very close affiliation pre- 
dic-ted upon a probable agreement with respect to their futuro 
conti'ol of and activities in North China. Manchuria and Mon- 
golia. 

The ultimatiun to Germany was directly inspired by 
Great Britain and grew out of the obligations of the Anglo- 
Japanese alliance. The primary purpose, of course, so far as 
England was concerned, was to cripple Germany in the Pa- 
cifie and safeguard her own shipping and inisular and conti- 
nental colonial possessions in that part of the world by de- 
priving Germany of the necessary naval base from which to 
operate. A .second con.sideration in which Russia. Japan and 
England would, of course, be united was to drive Germany 
from a position where she could in any wise interfere with 
their commercial and territorial activities in the Orient. The 
third, of course, mu.st be left to the future, and concerns 
Japan and Russia and now for the moment Japan alone. 
That which was formerly a mere inference has become certain 
by the revelation made of Russia's diplomatic secrets. Rus- 
sia and Japan were in thorough accord and had so separated 
their plans with respect to China, Manchuria and Mongolia 
that the.v no longer conflicted. Russia's advance would be 
through ilongolia and Japan's in ]\Ianchuria. 

The old Russia would not have given up her age-long 
purpose to obtain an open port on the Pacific. Did the de- 
mand upon Germany to surrender Kiao-chau to Japan fore- 
shadow that the goal of Russia's ambition, through the as- 
si.stance of Japan, would be attained? Would Japan have 
surrendered it to Russia in exchange for Russian support in 
Manchuria and perhaps Korea? Now that the Russian revo- 
lution has made Russia no longer an immediate factor in the 
Far Eastern problems, will Kiao-chau be of greater or of less 
value to Japan? The Russo-Japanese agreement of 1910 



was of far-reaching importauce; of its supplementary clauses 
not made public Mr. Bland says: "Japan has guaranteed 
to Russia a free hand in Mongolia in compensation for her an- 
nexation of Korea. On the whole it betokens a complete un- 
derstanding and harmonious purpose with respect to China. 
On June 11, 1910, Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Com- 
mons, seemed to put the seal of English approval on the 
Russo-Japanese entente by his announcement "that Russia 
iuid Japan has special interests in Mongolia and Manchuria." 
In ]911 northern Slongolia attempted to throw off Chinese 
sovereignity. How far the Russian traders at Urga and 
Kiakta influenced the tribal chiefs to this act cannot detin- 
itely l)e told. Russia mediated and secui'ed a recognition 
of north Mongolian autonomy; China's hold upon Mongolia 
was consequently weakened, while that of Russia was corres- 
pondingly .strengthened. In March, 1912, the so-called "Bel- 
gian"" loan was hurriedly made to China. It provided imme- 
diately for one million pounds sterling, and optionally for 
nine millions more. The security demanded and received was 
the Pekin-Kalgan Railroad, a part of the Mongolia line to 
Lake Baikal. It was soon disclased to the other powers and 
at all times known to China that the "Belgian" loan was 
really a Rus.sian undertaking, political in its origin. Says 
]\Ir. Bland: "The Pekin representative of the Ru.sso-Asiatic 
bank stated openly at the time that, although the Belgian bank 
had been put forward to sign the agreement, he had in fact 
negotiated it himself under instructions from the Russian min- 
ister of finance." 

Be that as it may, the raili-oad project, which for many 
years appeared on the maps as in the course of constrne- 
tion. in which Russia, prior to the German seizure of Kiao- 
chau. was much interested, but which during Russian occu- 
pancy of Port Arthur lay dormant, was at the outbreak of the 
war being revived. It is still on China's program and in- 
volves when completed a railroad via Kalgan to Urga in Mon- 
golia (124 miles of the railroad were finished and opened for 
traffic in ]!)09). The rails for 120 miles north of Kalgan have 



10 

since been laid, although the road has not been formally op- 
ened for traffic. In July, 1914, carloads of rails were being 
shipped through the Nankow pass and Kalgan for this exten- 
sion. It is, of course, not possible to speak in other than terms 
of conjecture, but siich a railroad from Lake Baikal to Pekin, 
opening up Mongolia, would, both in time and miles, be 
shorter than the existing routes to Vladivostok or Darien. It 
would strengthen materially Rns.sia"s position in ^Mongolia 
and aid her advance to the open sea. That this railroad activ- 
ity was influenced by Russia need hardly be doubted. Mr. 
Skrine (Russia) says: "Russia again took up the survey of 
the TraiLS-Siberian Railroad to connect with some point 120 
miles east of Lake Baikal." Russia safeguarded her interest 
in the Peldn-Kalgan Railroad by an understanding with 
China, that it shall not be submitted to foreign control. There 
appeared to have been an intimate connection between Rus- 
sia 's railroad and territorial activity in Mongolia and Japan 's 
ultimatum to Germany with respect to the port of Kiao-chau. 
The value of Kiao-chan to Japan either for retention or dis- 
liosition will depend upon the future of R.ussia and her in- 
fluence as a world power, but at present, at least, Japan does 
not need Kiao-ehau as a pawn with which to secure her hold 
upon ^lanchuria, for Russia is for the time being eliminated. 
It is the hazard of an opinion, but I ^■enture it, that Japan 
will not seek to retain for any considerable time control over 
Kiao-ehau or of the Shantung peninsula. 



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